Key Takeaway

In Maniyar Iliyaz v. P. Ayyappan, [1] the Supreme Court recognized and declared right to walk on demarcated footpaths as a fundamental right under Part III, specifically forming an integral part of right to movement under Article 19(1)(d), read with Article 19(1)(a), Article 19(1)(b), Article 19(1)(c) and Article 21 of the Constitution. These rights are primary and take precedence over movement by motor vehicles on roads, and are enforceable against urban and rural development authorities as it is their duty to establish safe and secure pedestrian infrastructure wherever a road exists. 

The Fundamental Right to Walk: A New Dimension to Article 19(1)(d)

While adjudicating a compensation claim under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, (MV Act) arising from a tragic incident where a five-year-old boy lost his life to a tanker while walking to school with his father due to the absence of a designated footpath, the Supreme Court in Maniyar Iliyas revisited the foundational basics of our liberties. The Court observed that the most basic and elemental form of a fundamental right is the right to walk. Although this right is inextricably linked to life and personal liberty under Article 21, it forms the bedrock of Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution (the right to move freely throughout the territory of India), a connection that had not been explicitly recognized until now. The Court reasoned that the right to movement under Article 19(1)(d) cannot be restricted to vehicular transport. Long before wheels revolutionized transportation, human beings walked as a natural expression of free will to work, to socialize, and to navigate daily life. Consequently, the Supreme Court established that the right to walk on a demarcated footpath is a primary right under Article 19(1)(d), one that takes precedence over the right to movement via motorized vehicles.

Duty of Public Authorities to Build Pedestrian Infrastructure

As noted above, right to walk takes precedence over the right to vehicular movement but this recognition does not grant pedestrians the liberty to walk untethered on roads explicitly designated for motor vehicles. Instead, the right to walk symbolizes a constitutional mandate for municipal, urban, and rural development bodies to provide citizens with safe, secure footpaths and pedestrian infrastructure. The Court ruled that wherever a road exists, a designated footpath must also exist, insulated from vehicular traffic to protect human life. The Court adamantly advocated that fatal accidents will remain inevitable until we transform our perspective on civil rights and the government’s corresponding obligations. Because these duties fall upon urban development authorities, municipal corporations, and panchayats, this fundamental right can be actively enforced against them. The following extract from the judgment is noteworthy:

It is not at all difficult to imagine how a wide, well-demarcated and uninterrupted footpath can change the beauty of and equitable access to our cities and towns – this could truly be transformative of our urban and rural living. In reality, how much does it take to create a well-demarcated footpath wherever a road exists? All that the fundamental right to walk demands is a comfortable space for an easy and carefree walk. Should this not be the minimum of the minimum duty that a municipal authority owes to the citizens?”

A Gateway to Other Fundamental Freedoms

Furthermore, the Court observed that the right to walk extends beyond mere physical transit; it serves as a vital conduit for realizing other fundamental guarantees. Physical movement is often the very means through which citizens gather to protest for social reform or express dissenting opinions. Thus, the act of walking is deeply rooted in the realization of:

  • Article 19(1)(a): Freedom of speech and expression;

  • Article 19(1)(b): Freedom to assemble peacefully and without arms;

  • Article 19(1)(c): Freedom to form associations or unions;

  • Article 21: Right to life and personal liberty

Ultimately, walking is recognized not just as locomotion, but as a powerful mechanism for expressing ideas, gathering peacefully, and acting collectively.

Legislative Gap

Part III of the Constitution has a unique relationship with Parliament and State Legislatures. While it injuncts and limits the legislature from making “laws that are inconsistent with or in derogation of fundamental rights“, it also envisages a positive role for the legislature to effectuate the exercise and enjoyment of the fundamental rights. And, even though MV Act provides offences, penalties and the procedure to lay claim for compensation for victims of road accidents, it is a legislation based on “vehicle” as a subject, while human interests are incidental which a motor vehicle must avoid violating. To fully realize this right, there is a compelling need to enact dedicated legislation that formally recognizes the right of pedestrians to use footpaths. Such a statute must impose a strict statutory duty upon public authorities to construct adequate pedestrian infrastructure, secure it from encroachments, and regulate its regular maintenance. Furthermore, the Act must effectively establish a regulatory body. Accordingly, the Supreme Court directed the Law Commission to examine a comprehensive statutory framework. The Court also issued directives to the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs, among other relevant ministries, to reflect on the urgent and compelling necessity of this legislative reform. 

Taking the circumstances into account, the Court directed that the case be re-numbered as an Article 32 petition under the title ‘Re: Fundamental Right to Walk and Footpath.’ Several relevant authorities will also be impleaded as parties.

Remedy Available for Violation of Right to Walk

Since, there is no dedicated legislation and legal remedy for the violation of right to walk on demarcated footpath, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized that the legal course available to a citizen seeking to protect their fundamental right to walk is through a restitutionary remedy, a proactive mechanism distinct from post-accident compensation claims under the MV Act. While the latter merely awards monetary damages after a tragedy has occurred, a restitutionary remedy focuses on structural accountability and restoration, legally compelling civic bodies to fulfill their public duties before harm is done. Available directly under the Constitution via writ jurisdiction (Article 32/226) or through Sections 38 to 40 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, this remedy allows individuals to obtain permanent or mandatory court injunctions against Urban Development Authorities, Municipal Corporations, Municipalities, or Panchayats. By utilizing these provisions, citizens can legally force local authorities to actively construct new pedestrian pathways, clear existing encroachments, and maintain secure walkways, thereby transforming pedestrian safety from an act of municipal charity into an enforceable constitutional right. 
  1.  2026 INSC 647